I. INTRODUCTION
A striking feature of the United States labor market experience during the past twenty years has been the dramatic rise in earnings and wage inequality that occurred during the 1980s. 1 Past research has documented the various dimensions of this trend: the sharp rise in wage differences between more-and less-educated workers, the growing wage disparity between moreand less-experienced workers, and the rise in wage inequality within groups narrowly de ned by age, education, and gender-socalled ''within-group'' inequality. 2 Researchers have proposed a number of explanations for these relative wage movements, most of which can be characterized as either a demand explanation (technological change, import competition), a supply story (immi-* I am indebted to David Card, Lawrence Katz, and Orley Ashenfelter for invaluable comments on earlier drafts. I also thank Michael Boozer, Gena Estes, Michael Greenstone, Bo Honoré, and Thomas Lemieux for many helpful discussions, and Daron Acemoglu, Joshua Angrist, Kenneth Chay, Alan Krueger, Christina Lee, Andrew Oswald, Jörn-Steffen Pischke, Cecilia Rouse, two anonymous referees, and participants of the Princeton Industrial Relations Section Labor Seminar and Labor Lunch, and of the MIT Labor Seminar for their comments and suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge the National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship for nancial support, and the National Bureau of Economic Research-West, where much of this research was conducted.
1. Levy and Murnane [1992] and Katz and Autor [1999] provide a survey of research on earnings and wage inequality. Gottschalk [1997] also provides a summary of the general trends and dimensions of wage inequality in the United States.
2. See Katz and Murphy [1992] ; Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce [1993] ; and Murphy and Welch [1992] . gration of less-skilled workers), or an institutional factor (deunionization, the minimum wage). 3 An equally striking development that accompanied dramatic increases in wage inequality in the United States during the 1980s was the longest sustained decline in the real value of the federal minimum wage in the previous four decades, as it reached its lowest point since the 1950s. 4 As shown below, decreases in the minimum wage tend to increase measured wage inequality, regardless of its effect on employment, earnings, or income. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux [1996] demonstrate that the minimum wage is an important empirical feature of the observed distribution of wages during the 1980s. At the least, their ndings suggest that the declining real value of the minimum wage signi cantly obscures the impact of factors such as relative supply and demand shifts or other institutional changes on the wage distribution throughout the decade. In this paper I attempt to answer the question: after accounting for the impact of the minimum wage, did ''underlying'' wage inequality in the United States rise during the 1980s? In particular, what was the net impact of all factors, other than the minimum wage, on the wage distribution?
It is difficult to answer these questions from an analysis of aggregate time series data because the steady increase in the dispersion of observed wages is closely paralleled by a steady decrease in the relative level of the minimum wage during the 1980s, making it virtually impossible to separate the effect of the minimum wage from a time trend.
Instead, this study utilizes the differential impact of the federal minimum wage across regions within the United States to directly estimate the contribution of the falling relative value of the minimum wage to increasing wage inequality in the lower half of the wage distribution since 1979. The interaction of state variation in overall wage levels and a uniform federal minimum wage generates cross-state variation in ''effective'' minimum wage levels. The assumption that this variation is not systematically related to the shape of the ''underlying'' wage distribution-the distribution of wage rates that would prevail in the absence of any minimum wage-permits the data to separately identify the impact of the minimum wage from nationwide growth in ''latent'' wage dispersion during the 1980s.
When regional wage distribution data constructed from the Current Population Survey are used, the resulting estimates of the impact of the minimum wage imply that after accounting for the minimum wage, average growth in wage dispersion in the lower tail of states' wage distributions during the 1980s is quite modest. In fact, the estimates for men, women, as well as the combined sample, imply that almost all of the growth in the wage gap between the tenth and ftieth percentiles is attributable to the erosion of the real value of the federal minimum during the decade.
I provide some evidence suggesting that the identifying assumption may be inappropriate for the male sample of workers. On the other hand, the same kind of evidence lends support to the validity of the main identi cation strategy when analyzing women, and when considering the unconditional distribution of wages. For example, estimates from using variation in legislated changes in minimum wages (which arise from an interaction between the 1990-1991 federal increases and preexisting variability in statespeci c minimum wage laws) are quite similar to those generated by cross-state variability in the relative minimum.
The results also imply that accounting for the minimum wage only moderately affects the magnitude of changes in wage differentials by gender, race, educational attainment, and experience, and leaves the broad trends unaffected. On the other hand, this paper's results imply that the minimum wage may account for as much as 80 percent of the growth in so-called ''within-group'' wage inequality during the 1980s. When examining men and women separately, overall growth in wage inequality during the 1980s remains substantial, due to the appreciable growth in dispersion in the upper tail of the wage distribution, where the minimum wage is unlikely to have an impact. Curiously, after accounting for the minimum wage, the unconditional distribution (without regard to gender) of wages appears to be surprisingly stable throughout the 1980s.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief summary of the trends in wage inequality that serve to motivate the present study. Section III discusses how state variation in effective minimum wage levels can be used to separately identify the effect of a declining minimum wage from an underlying rise in wage dispersion. Section IV describes the empirical implementa-
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tion and presents the results of the estimation. Section V examines the effect of the increases in the federal minimum wage on wage inequality from 1989 to 1991. Section VI uses the estimates of this study to adjust measures of between-and within-group wage inequality for the minimum wage effect. Finally, Section VII concludes with a discussion of the implications of the ndings in this paper for future research.
II. CHANGES IN THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION IN THE 1980S

A. Data
The analysis in this paper utilizes microdata from the National Bureau of Economic Research Extracts of the Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files. These data consist of point-in-time measures of the hourly rate of pay, which make it appropriate for a study of the impact of a wage oor on the wage distribution. For workers not paid on an hourly basis, usual weekly earnings and usual weekly hours can be used to construct an average hourly wage. These data's large sample sizes (three times the size of a single month of data from the CPS) and annual frequency make them suitable for a detailed regional analysis throughout the decade of the 1980s. Details of the preprocessing of the data are reported in the Data Appendix.
The three parts of Figure I depict the (hours-weighted) kernel density estimate of the distribution of log-wages from these data for the years 1979 and 1989, for men, women, and all workers (men and women combined). 5 In each panel the two vertical lines denote the federal minimum wage levels in each year. The gure suggests that in 1979 the minimum wage had, to some extent, a supporting effect on wages; after its relative level's erosion during the decade, by 1989, the minimum wage appears to have much less of an in uence on the shape of the distribution. The impression that the minimum wage was an important feature of the lower part of the wage distribution is particularly striking for the female wage distribution. Figure IC suggests the possibility that the decline in the relative value of the minimum wage over the decade was primarily responsible for changes in the unconditional wage distribution, since much of the change appears to occur in the lower tail.
5. The sample includes individuals aged sixteen and over. The horizontal axis measures the log-wage relative to the overall (men and women) median in each year. All kernel density estimates use the rule-of-thumb bandwidth h 5 0.79Rn 2 1/ 5 , where R is the interquartile range [Silverman 1986 ].
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
This paper follows the wage inequality literature's usual practice of conducting formal analyses for men and women separately. But since changes in the lower tail appear to be a relatively more important component of the total change when examining the unconditional distribution of wages (without regard to gender), some attention will also be given to the ndings for the entire sample. Examining the entire sample-the distribution of hourly pay for hours worked in the economy-allows some abstraction from issues that arise when men and women are thought to compete in the same labor market, when changes in the male and female distributions are to some extent interdependent. 6 Thus, this paper's estimates of changes in the unconditional distribution of wages-after parsing out the minimum wage effect-could be interpreted as the net impact of betweengender wage changes [O'Neill and Polachek 1993; Fortin and Lemieux 1996; Blau and Kahn 1997] , and other ''within-gender'' forces such as skill-biased technological change [Davis and Haltiwanger 1991; Bound and Johnson 1992; Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1997; Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997] , international trade [Borjas and Ramey 1995; Feenstra and Hanson 1996] , and more generally rising ''skill premiums'' stemming from an increase in the demand for skilled labor [Katz and Murphy 1992; Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994] .
The available time series data on the United States wage distribution also point to a close connection between the minimum wage and changes in inequality. Figure II plots changes in percentiles of the wage distribution, relative to the median, for the fth, tenth, twenty-fth, seventy-fth, and ninetieth wage percentiles between 1973 and 1993. 7 These measures of wage dispersion, as well as the log difference between the federal minimum wage and the median wage (also shown in the gure) are normalized to be zero in 1979, which appears to be a turning point for several of the series. Figure II shows that after rising modestly during the latter half of the 1970s, the minimum wage (relative to the median wage) fell almost 40 log points in the period between 1979 and 1989. The sharp rebound in 1990 and 1991 re ects the legislated rise in the federal minimum wage from $3.35 to $3.80 in April of FIGURE Ia Wage Distribution Density Estimates: Men, 1979 -1989 FIGURE Ib Wage Distribution Density Estimates: Women, 1979 Women, -1989 1990 and then to $4.25 in April of 1991. The gure illustrates that with the exception of the last few years of the 1980s and the period after 1991, movements in wage dispersion in the lower half of the wage distribution moved in close tandem with changes in the minimum wage. The fth and tenth percentiles rise in the latter part of the 1970s, experience a sharp decline during much of the 1980s, and then rebound modestly in the early 1990s. 8 Finally, Figure II shows that while changes in the seventyfth wage percentile have been small, there has been a steady rise in the ninetieth percentile throughout the 1973-1993 period. That the minimum wage is unlikely to have played any part in this particular trend underscores the limited inferences that can be made from an examination of the aggregate time series data. For example, there is nearly as much evidence here to suggest that the 8. It should be noted that trends in measures of dispersion in average hourly earnings as computed from the Census and the March CPS differ somewhat from that calculated from the May CPS during the 1970s. For example, the 90-10 differential for women falls by about 11 percent in the May CPS, but rises 3 percent in the March CPS. See Katz and Autor [1998] for a summary of differences across the data sets over the past few decades.
FIGURE Ic
Wage Distribution Density Estimates: Men and Women, 1979-1989 WAGE INEQUALITY AND THE MINIMUM WAGE minimum wage contributed to growth in the ninetieth percentile, as there is to suggest that it caused a decline in the tenth percentile. The effective decline in the minimum wage, and the growth in inequality in the lower half of the wage distribution, are both monotonic throughout the 1980s. As a result, no analysis of the aggregate time series data will be able to adequately distinguish a minimum wage effect from a rising trend in ''latent'' wage inequality-which I de ne here to be a rise in wage inequality that would have occurred in the absence of a minimum wage policy.
B. Regional Variation in the ''Effective'' Minimum Wage
The time-series pattern of wage dispersion in the lower tail is not uniform across regions in the United States. Figure III plots the average 10-50 log (wage) differential during 1979-1991 for two groups of states: the three highest-wage states (New Jersey, 
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Michigan, and Maryland) and the three lowest-wage states (South Dakota, Mississippi, and Arkansas). 9 The low-wage states, which initially begin with a more compressed lower tail than the high-wage states, experience an average increase in dispersion of about twenty log points throughout the 1980s, and a subsequent compression of about ve log points during 1989-1991. By contrast, the 10-50 differential for the highest-wage states appears relatively stable during the entire 1979-1991 period.
This additional dimension of wage inequality and its relation to the relative level of the minimum wage across regions offer an opportunity to distinguish the minimum wage effect from a national trend in latent wage dispersion. In particular, the interaction between a uniform federal minimum wage and wide 9. These six states were selected from the state-level panel data set described in the Data Appendix. Average median wages for the entire period were computed. The three highest and three lowest overall averages were chosen, excluding all states for which there was at least one year where the state minimum exceeded the federal minimum wage rate. The differentials are for the entire sample aged sixteen or over.
FIGURE III 10-50, 75-50 Log(Wage) Differentials: High-versus Low-Wage States, 1979 States, -1991 WAGE INEQUALITY AND THE MINIMUM WAGE variation in wage levels across states yields variability in ''effective'' minimum wage levels. The federal minimum wage highly impacts low-wage states, while minimally affecting high-wage states. This is demonstrated in Figure IV , which plots (hoursweighted) kernel density estimates of log-wages in 1979 for three groups of states: high-, medium-, and low-wage states. 10 The horizontal scale measures the log-wage relative to each group's respective median wage. The vertical lines represent the federal minimum wage, also relative to each group's respective median. Figure IV gives the impression that low-wage states are indeed more highly impacted by the minimum wage than higher-wage states. It is this variation that is exploited in the present study.
Stratifying the wage distribution by a dimension other than geography would likely produce a similar result. And crosssectional variation in effective minimum wages across educational groups, for example, could be used to estimate a minimum wage effect. However, in this study variation across states has a few important advantages over variation across other groups such as education, age, industry, or occupation. First, on a conceptual level, variation in the relative minimum across states more closely mimics the variation that would be most ideal (but that is also unattainable) for estimating the impact of the minimum wage on the wage distribution. These ideal data would consist of a sample of independent realizations of the wage distribution of the United States labor market at one point in time, and exhibit variability in the minimum wage across realizations. Each state's labor market can be more readily considered a microcosm of the United States labor market than can any particular group of workers de ned by education, age, or industrial or occupational sector.
Second, as described in detail in Section V, by the late-1980s there arose moderate variation in state-legislated minimum wage levels. This variability in state-speci c minimum wages, combined with the 1990-1991 legislated increases in the federal minimum, generates an alternative source of variation from which the impact of the minimum wage can be identi ed.
A potential problem with utilizing the substantial regional 10. I rank each state by the mean log-wage. I choose the bottom seven (Arkansas, Mississippi, Vermont, Maine, South Carolina, South Dakota, and North Carolina), middle seven (Idaho, Oklahoma, Kentucky, Kansas, Virginia, Missouri, and Indiana), and highest seven (Oregon, Wyoming, California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, and Washington) for the three groups. The sample sizes for the low-, medium-, and high-wage states are 12,263, 16,190, 31,932, respectively.
variation in wage levels, is that if high-wage states tend to possess greater latent wage dispersion, the use of the cross-sectional variation illustrated in Figure IV would lead to an exaggerated estimate of the impact of the minimum wage. A test of whether overall latent wage dispersion is empirically related to wage levels lies in being able to detect such a correlation where the minimum wage is not likely to be a factor, such as at the upper tail of the wage distribution. Figure III provides evidence to suggest that such a systematic relation is not apparent in these data. The average 75-50 differentials for the very highest-and lowest-wage states appear to be comparable throughout the 1979-1991 period.
Of course, the assumption that this property also holds for the lower tails of states' latent wage distributions is, strictly speaking, untestable. However, a signi cant, systematic relation between latent wage dispersion in the upper tail and overall wage levels (and hence the ''effective'' minimum wage) across regions would seem to considerably weaken our con dence in its validity. Hence, an examination of the relation between the relative minimum 
WAGE INEQUALITY AND THE MINIMUM WAGE
wage and measures of dispersion of the upper tail will provide a useful speci cation check for the formal empirical analyses presented below.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF CHANGES IN LATENT WAGE INEQUALITY
A. Theoretical Relation between Wage Dispersion and the Minimum Wage
Below, I formally model the relation between the variability in the relative ''bite'' of the minimum wage and the observed wage distribution across regions in a way that allows separate identication of the average growth in latent wage inequality. The approach in this study is to use the various log(wage) percentile differentials to measure wage dispersion, and the log-differential between the logs of the minimum wage and some measure of the centrality (or location) of the distribution to measure the ''effective minimum wage.'' 11 Below, I characterize the theoretical relation between these two quantities under three distinct scenarios. I denote the latent and observed pth log-wage percentile of state j by w j p* and w j p , respectively, and the log of the nominal minimum wage by minwage. Although I utilize other measures of centrality in the formal empirical analysis, I begin by considering w j 50 , the median wage. Also, for the sake of exposition, I assume that the shapes of the latent wage distribution in all states are strictly identical, up to location: w j p* 2 w j 50 * 5 w k p* 2 w k 50 * ; j,k.
12
Case 1, ''Censoring'': no spillovers, no disemployment . In this extreme case, the only effect of the minimum wage is to raise the wages of those initially making less than the minimum to exactly the level of the wage oor. Across states we expect to see the relation, 11. In the remainder of the paper, I often refer to the effective minimum wage as the ''relative minimum wage'' or simply ''the minimum wage,'' when dealing with a cross section of states.
12. That the latent distributions are strictly identical across states is certainly false in practice, but abstracting from stochastic elements, which will be more formally introduced in Section IV, aids in describing the intuition behind the identi cation.
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This relation across states is depicted in Figure V as line A 0 A 1 .
13
For states that possess ''effective minimums'' that are smaller than the latent 10-50 differential, there is no relation between the differential and the relative minimum (the at portion of the line). For states where the relative minimum is above the latent 10-50 differential, the observed 10-50 differential is exactly equal to the differential between the minimum wage and the median (the portion coincident with the 45 degree line).
Case 2, ''Spillovers,'' no disemployment. More generally, the minimum wage may have an effect on the pth percentile even if (minwage 2 w j 50 ) , (w j p 2 w j 50 ), so that we have (2) w j 10 2 w j 50 5 g(minwage 2 w j 50 ), 13 . I am assuming that the minimum wage is never higher than the latent median wage for any state.
FIGURE V Minimum Wage Decline and Growth in Latent Wage Dispersion
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where g will generally be an increasing function, as long as the ''spillover'' effect monotonically diminishes, the higher the wage percentile. An example of such a function is depicted as line A 0 A 2 in Figure V . Note that, across states, a marginal rise in the effective minimum, even among states with minimums lower than the 10-50 differential, causes an increase in the tenth wage percentile relative to the median.
Case 3, ''Truncation'': no spillovers, full disemployment. In this case, the minimum wage has no impact on workers with latent wages already above the minimum, and causes job loss for all workers with latent wages below the minimum (i.e., truncation of the wage distribution); we will not observe the latter's wages. The loss of the sample in the lower tail mechanically leads to changes in the observed percentiles of the wage distribution. For example, if, for state j, minwage 5 w j 10 *, then this model implies that we will not observe wages for workers who would have earned w j 10 * (or less) in the absence of the minimum. As a result, the observed (posttruncation) w j 10 cannot equal w j 10 *; instead, it will equal the 10 1 (0.10 3 90) 5 19th percentile of the latent wage distribution. As shown in Lee [1998] , under some regularity conditions for the shape of the latent wage distribution, this truncation model implies that w j 10 2 w j 50 will be an increasing function of (minwage 2 w j 50 ); simulations of the shape of this relation using actual wage data show that it is generally increasing and exhibits curvature similar to that depicted by line A 0 A 2 in Figure V .
In each of these three cases (and in hybrids), there is a nonlinear relation that is expected between the relative minimum wage measure and the observed 10-50 differential. As the relative minimum declines inde nitely, the relation asymptotes to a horizontal line, corresponding to the latent 10-50 differential that is common across all states. I forgo an attempt to empirically distinguish between disemployment (Case 3) and spillover effects (Case 2) of the minimum wage on the observed wage distribution. Instead, I simply note that in the arguably more realistic case of some disemployment and some spillover effects (a hybrid of Cases 2 and 3), any positive empirical relation between w j 10 2 w j 50 and (minwage 2 w j 50 ) will be an overestimate of true spillover effects; some of it will be a statistical ''illusion'' that is a natural QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS consequence of both employment loss and the fact that we only observe wages for those who are working. 14 Consider rst a signi cant decline in the relative value of the federal minimum wage. We expect a leftward shift in the locus representing the 50 states, from line A 0 A 1 to B 0 B 1 in Figure V , for example. In addition, if all of the states experienced an expansion in the latent 10-50 wage differential, this would be additionally re ected in a downward shift from line B 0 B 1 to line C 0 C 1 . When these two events happen simultaneously, we will only observe data corresponding to lines A 0 A 1 and C 0 C 1 . In this example, the rise in observed wage dispersion of the median state (which is denoted by the black square of each locus) is fully due to a rise in latent wage inequality rather than to the falling relative level of the minimum wage. Figure V also illustrates a contrasting example, where the states' relative minimums and the 10-50 differentials are represented by lines A 0 A 2 (in the initial period) and D 0 D 1 (the latter period). In this case, there is a much smaller increase in latent wage inequality, with most of the average rise in dispersion attributable to the decline in the federal minimum.
B. Wage Dispersion and the Minimum Wage across States
Figure VIa is the empirical analog of Figure V , constructed from a sample of states in 1979 and 1989. 15 The horizontal axis measures the federal minimum wage, relative to the state median wage, and the vertical axis measures the 10-50 log-wage differential. The two solid lines represent the tted values of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions (weighted by the sample size of the state-year), one for each year, of (w 10 2 w 50 ) on (minwage 2 w 50 ) and its squared value.
The gure reveals a strong positive association between the relative positions of the tenth percentile and the minimum wage, particularly in 1979, when the tenth percentile is either at or 14. As discussed in Lee [1998] , the full truncation model produces a small negative relation between upper tail measures of dispersion and the relative minimum, since the truncation effect diminishes higher up in the distribution. In the more realistic case of some disemployment and some spillovers, the relation is even weaker.
15. Data come from the state-level panel data set described in the Appendix. So that all the variation in the effective minimum wage comes from variation in the states' medians, I exclude states with legislated minimum wage rates higher than the federal minimum: Alaska for 1979, and Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin for 1989. Robustness to differing samples is mentioned in Section IV.
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slightly above the minimum wage for a majority of the states. The regression lines, especially that for 1989, exhibit some nonlinearity, as the relation between the effective minimum wage and the 10-50 differential appears to atten to the left. The estimated coefficients on the quadratic terms for both years are each statistically signi cant from zero at the 0.05 level.
Overall, there appears to be little evidence of a downward shift in the wage dispersion-minimum wage relation over time. In fact, an OLS regression using the data from both years, and including a year dummy variable, yields a coefficient of 0.062 (with a standard error of 0.017) on the 1989 dummy, implying that there is a slight upward shift in the relation-a decrease in latent wage dispersion as measured by the 10-50 wage differential. Most of the data points in 1989 are signi cantly above the 45 degree line. This implies that there was a real potential for the states' FIGURE VIa 10-50 Log (Wage) Differential, Relative Minimum Wage, across States: 1979 States: , 1989 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS tenth percentiles to fall farther than they did. However, the 10-50 differentials fell by an amount that was no more-and, if anything, less-than what would be expected as a response to a uniform decline in the relative level of the minimum wage. An important caveat to this empirical approach is that, in the presence of a nonlinear relation between the relative minimum and wage percentile differentials, the identi cation of a downward shift in the relation becomes difficult when the minimum wage is ''too binding'' across all states. For example, suppose that in 1979, all of the states' 10-50 lay exactly on the 45-degree line in Figure VIa . Even in the absence of any change in the relative minimum, we could expect an increase in latent wage dispersion to produce no change in the empirical relation; the states would continue to lie on the 45-degree line, and no downward shift could be detected. Nor could we detect a modest upward shift in the 
relation if the latent tenth percentile were initially far enough below the relative minimum for all states. 16 The advantage of using percentile differentials as the dependent variable is that we can examine other wage percentiles, higher up in the wage distribution, where this problem does not exist. 17 For example, Figure VIb plots the analogous empirical relation to Figure VIa , for the 20-50 log-wage differential. Again, the gure reveals that after accounting for the declining federal minimum, there appears to be a slight decrease in wage dispersion. 18 Examining samples of workers with generally higher wages (older workers, men) (as is done in Section IV) similarly alleviates the potential identi cation problem described above.
Before presenting the formal empirical analysis, it is important to clarify the nature of what appears to be a ''mechanical'' relation between the dependent and independent variables, since the state median wage is used in the measure of dispersion, as well as to construct the relative minimum wage variable. It appears that the empirical relation between these two quantities may exaggerate the impact of the minimum wage. There are two distinct components to this possibility.
The rst arises when sampling error is an important part of the total variability in state median wages. For example, even if no relation exists between the two variables, the fact that the sample median and the sample tenth percentile are not perfectly correlated implies there will be a spurious positive relation between the 10-50 differential and the relative minimum. However, the state-by-state sample sizes from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group Files are reasonably large (on average about 3000 per state-year), and hence on average the sampling error for the typical state's median is about 0.01, implying that less than 1 percent of the variation in the relative minimum is due to sampling error. 19 Furthermore, this problem can be somewhat 16. Identi cation is also weakened when there is little ''overlap'' of the ranges of the effective minimum for the two years. If there is no overlap at all, identi cation relies heavily on functional form assumptions about the underlying shape of the minimum wage's impact on wage dispersion. In the formal empirical analysis, however, sufficient overlap is generated by using data from all intermediate years between 1979 and 1989. 17. An examination of Appendix 2 provides a sense of how close the relative minimums are to the various wage percentiles across states.
18. The coefficient on the 1989 year dummy in a (weighted by observation per state-year) pooled regression of the 20-50 differential on the relative minimum and its square is 0.0226 with a standard error of (0.0123).
19. A similar calculation yields that sampling variability is about 10 percent of the within-state variance.
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alleviated by using an alternative measure of centrality to create the relative minimum wage variable, which I utilize in Section IV.
Second, apart from the sampling issue, even the absence of the minimum wage, there may be relatively greater variability in the median than in percentiles of the lower or upper tails. For example, if there is relatively little variability in the tenth latent wage percentiles across states, then on average a state with a large median wage will have both a lower relative minimum, as well as a larger gap between the tenth percentile and the median, independently of any minimum wage effect. It should be noted that this possibility is one speci c example of a violation of the identifying assumption: that, on average, wage levels are uncorrelated with latent wage dispersion. On the other hand, if we could be assured that locational amenities, for example, generated compensating state wage differentials that were constant across all of each state's percentiles wage distribution, and that the difference in the median was an adequate measure of the state wage differential, then no relation would exist between any of the latent percentile differentials and the relative minimum wage, even though the median would be used to construct both measures.
More generally, some scenarios (including the hypothesis described above-greater variability across states in the middle of the distribution than in the tails) that posit a systematic relation between latent wage dispersion and the location of the distribution, as measured by the median, will have the observable implication of a signi cant relation between upper tail measures of dispersion and the median. Figure VIb , which plots the 75-50 differential against the relative minimum for this subsample, illustrates that such a correlation is weak in these data. 20 This nding is at odds with the notion that high-wage states inherently possess uniformly greater latent wage dispersion.
In order to be consistent with the pattern of data shown in Figure VI , alternative stories positing a correlation between latent wage dispersion and the median wage must be able to explain (1) why only the upper tail measure of dispersion appears uncorrelated with median, and (2) why the empirical relation for the lower tail is much stronger in 1979 than in 1989, diminishing over the course of the 1980s.
20. The coefficient on the relative minimum variable in a pooled regression of the 75-50 differential on a year dummy and the minimum is 0.046 with a standard error of 0.028.
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IV. ESTIMATION OF CHANGES IN LATENT WAGE INEQUALITY:
1979-1988
A. Estimating Equation
In the presence of stochastic variation in latent wage dispersion across states, the main identifying assumption used in this study can be motivated as follows. Suppose that each state j at time t has a latent log-wage distribution that can be characterized by the cumulative distribution function,
where µ jt and s jt are centrality and scale parameters, respectively. F t (·), the ''shape'' of the latent wage distribution in year t, is constant across regions. The latent log-wage percentile p of state j at time t is thus
where the asterisk emphasizes that this is the latent wage percentile. Normalize the average s t 5 E[s jt t] to be constant over time, s t 5 1. Then the quantity of interest is the change in the dispersion (particularly, in the lower tail) of F t (·) over time.
The main identifying assumption in this analysis is that conditional on t, s jt is independent of µ jt : conditional on the year, the centrality measure of the state wage distribution is not systematically correlated with latent wage dispersion across states. If the observed median wage w jt 50 is an adequate measure of µ jt (i.e., F t 2 1 (50) 5 0), then for any given year and percentile p of the latent wage distribution, (5) vanishes, which means that in this parameterization, the estimated a t is an estimate of the average latent 10-50 differential in year t, or F t 2 1 (10). Note that the above parameterization captures the basic features of the various functions depicted in Figure V .
22
In particular, as B 2`, the function becomes the ''censoring'' case (Case 1).
An examination of Figure VI suggests that a reasonable, simple alternative to the parameterization in equation (6) is the estimation of the equation, (7) w jt 10 2 w jt 50 5 a t 1 b · mw jt 1 g · mw jt 2 1 u jt , where the approximation error u jt is assumed to be orthogonal to mw jt and its square. This is simply the regression of the 10-50 log-wage differential on the relative minimum (and its square), and year dummies, using the panel of states throughout the 1980s. Again, changes in the a t 's represent changes in nationwide latent wage inequality (as measured by the 10-50 log-wage differential).
example, necessarily implies a negative correlation between the latent lower tail differential (such as the 10-50) and the relative minimum. This equation shows that the most appropriate de ator of the minimum is the best measure of centrality (a percentile q such that F t 2 1 (q) 5 0). 22. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this parameterization. B. Results: 1979 B. Results: -1988 Panel A of Table I reports the least squares estimates of equations (7) and (6) using the panel data set of 50 states across ten years from 1979-1988 for the entire sample of earners (both men and women), as described in the Appendix. In the estimation, mw is de ned as log(max[state minimum wage, federal minimum wage]) 2 w 50 . Column (1) shows that the dependent variable (w 10 2 w 50 ) declines signi cantly throughout the decade. Including a linear term in mw, column (2) shows that the estimated slope, 0.509, is highly signi cant, implying that a 1 percent fall in the minimum wage leads to a 0.5 percent fall in the tenth percentile, relative to the median. The empirical t of the regression increases substantially, the R 2 rising from 0.245 to 0.755.
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Most importantly, the coefficients on the year dummies all rise toward zero. Whereas the average 10-50 differential is 2 0.107 in 1985 (relative to 1979), the average change after accounting for a linear term in mw is virtually zero for that same year. In fact, there is an increase of 4.7 log points in the relative position of the tenth percentile-a decrease in latent wage dispersion-between 1979 and 1988, after the inclusion of mw.
Column (3) includes a quadratic term, and demonstrates that the nonlinear aspect of the empirical relation is important. 23 In this speci cation, none of the year coefficients are negative, and the coefficient on 1988 is statistically different from zero, at positive 0.043. Column (4) demonstrates that the trend toward compression in the 10-50 differential is even more pronounced when equation (6) is estimated by Nonlinear Least Squares, although the standard errors of the year coefficients rise appreciably.
To alleviate, at least to some extent, the potential spurious correlation induced by sampling error (since the sample median is used to construct both the 10-50 differential and mw), I examine an alternative estimate of centrality, w t , which is the trimmed mean (where the bottom 30 percent and top 30 percent of the sample for each state-year are eliminated) as a de ator for the minimum wage. Column (5), which uses mw jt 5 (minwage 2 w jt t ), shows that the coefficients are quite similar to those in column (3). Although the coefficients in column (3) and column (5) are nearly identical for this sample and speci cation, for the remainder of the paper I utilize mw jt because sampling error in the median may be more serious in other speci cations (such as a within-state 23. Cubic and quartic terms have negligible effects on the results.
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estimator, where the population variability in the locational shift of the distribution is diminished). 24 One should note that in this sample period, several of the states legislated their own minimum wage rates to be higher than the federal rate. The analysis thus far also implicitly assumes that the nominal state-legislated minimum wage is not systematically related to latent wage dispersion across states. To examine how legislative endogeneity may be affecting the results, I repeated the estimation for the subsample of states for which the state minimum wage did not exceed the federal rate at any time during the 1979-1988 period. Although not reported here, the results are quite similar, suggesting that even if state-legislated minimum wages were endogenously determined for these excluded states, the effect is not large enough to noticeably in uence the basic results of Panel A of Table I . 25 Panel B of Table I reports results from using the speci cation of column (5) in Panel A for various subsamples, based on gender and age. For each subsample, the table reports (1) the ten-year annualized trend of the 10-50 differential (based on a regression of the year coefficients on a linear trend), (2) the estimated annualized trend when mw and its square are included, (3) the coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms of mw, (4) the derivative implied by the coefficients evaluated at the overall mean of mwfor the 1979-1988 period, and (5) the R 2 . As might be expected, the table shows that among workers with generally higher wages (men and older workers) the relative minimum has a more modest impact on the 10-50 differential. The implied derivative is as high as 0.597 for all women earners aged 16 and over, to as low as 0.182 for men aged 25-64. Overall, the table shows that for almost every sample, most of the trend in the 10-50 differential disappears when mw is included. For women the trend in latent wage dispersion cannot be statistically distinguished from zero, and for the entire sample the estimated trend in latent wage dispersion is small, but in the opposite direction of the observed trend. An important exception is the nding for men, aged 25-64, where much of the growth in 24. The root mean squared error of a regression on mw on mwis 0.011 (the R 2 is 0.996). 25. This table is reported in Lee [1998] , which also includes an analysis where the procedure of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux [1996] is used to adjust for differences in observable covariates across state-year observations. After adjusting for state differences in demographic, industrial, and occupational composition in this way, the year coefficients analogous to those in Table I , Panel A, appear to be virtually unaltered. See Lee [1998] for more details and discussion.
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inequality remains after the inclusion of mw. For the rest of the analysis, so that results can be readily compared with previous research utilizing the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data [DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996] , I focus on workers aged 18-64.
In principle, the panel nature of the state-level data set provides an alternative to cross-sectional identifying variation. Within-state variability in mwcan also be exploited to identify the 
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impact of the minimum wage on the wage distribution. In particular, suppose that instead of a t in equation (7) we have (8) a jt 5 a j 1 a t .
The validity of this '' xed effects'' approach relies on the assumption that, within-state, wage levels are uncorrelated with latent wage dispersion after taking out year effects. Hence, a consistent sensitivity of latent wage inequality to regional economic booms or downturns is likely to contaminate the true impact of mw on (w j p 2 w j 50 ). A disadvantage of using this variation is that most of the variability in mw(after taking out time effects) is generated by cross-state as opposed to within-state variability. The root mean 
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squared error from a regression of mw on year dummies for the full sample is 0.125; adding state dummies to this regression lowers it to 0.031, implying that only (0.031/0.125) 2 5 0.062 of the residual variance (after taking out time effects) in mw is due to ''within-state'' variability. 26 Thus, we might expect identi cation in a state xed effects speci cation to be considerably weaker than in a pooled cross-section speci cation. In addition, the reduced identifying variation resulting from eliminating the ''permanent'' state effects may magnify biases due to misspeci cation, in the same way biases stemming from measurement error in the independent variable are magni ed when true variation in the independent variable is reduced.
Perhaps the best available indication of which speci cation is more appropriate is given by the correlation between mw and measures of wage dispersion in the upper tail. A speci cation that yields a signi cant relation between mwand dispersion in the upper tail, where we are reasonably con dent that the minimum has no effect, might be viewed with more suspicion when considering the empirical relation between mwand dispersion in the lower tail. Table II reports the coefficient on mw in OLS regressions of the 60-, 70-, 80-, and 90-50 wage differentials on mwand a set of 26. A relatively small fraction of the variation in mwis due to variability in the nominal state-speci c minimum wage. The addition of these nominal rates to the pooled cross-section and xed effects speci cations yield root mean squared errors of 0.121 and 0.032. 
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year dummies, with and without state dummies, for the three samples. Focusing on the 60-, 70-, and 80-50 differentials, two patterns emerge. First, it appears that the slope coefficients are considerably smaller for women or for the combined sample than for men alone. For women the pooled cross-section estimates for the upper percentiles range between 2 0.035 and 2 0.016 with standard errors of about 0.01 or 0.02. For the combined sample the pooled cross-section coefficients for the 60-and 70-50 differentials cannot be statistically rejected from zero, but the 80-50 estimates are statistically different from zero for both speci cations. The comparable estimates for men are much larger in absolute magnitude; for example, the 70-50 pooled cross-section estimate is 0.124 and as high as 0.256 for the 80-50 xed effects estimate.
Second, the absolute values of the coefficients tend to be larger in the state xed effects speci cation. The 70-50 coefficient for the entire sample rises from 0.022 to 0.069, and the 80-50 coefficient rises from 2 0.016 to 0.085 for women, and from 0.207 to 0.256 for men.
Although I include results for the 90-50 differential for completeness, the coefficient for men and the entire sample should be interpreted with caution, because of the increasing importance of the weekly earnings topcode in the latter part of the 1980s. This is because a nontrivial and nominal topcode will naturally cause a positive association between the relative minimum and the 90-50 differential, since high-wage states will have their ninetieth percentiles arti cially lowered to a greater extent than low-wage states. 27 If the empirical relations between mw and the upper tail differentials are considered a valid speci cation check, Table II seems to suggest that when examining the empirical results for the lower tails, we can be most con dent in the results for women in the pooled cross section, more cautious about the results for the entire sample, and considerably more suspicious for the results for men. In the same way, the state xed effects might be viewed with more caution relative to the pooled cross-sectional results.
27. In order to assess the magnitude of this problem, I use the 1989 data (when the topcode changed to an irrelevantly higher level), and arti cially topcode the weekly earnings level to where the pre-1989 level is (adjusted by the CPI), for each year. I compare regression coefficients of the 90-50 differential in the actual data for 1989, with that from utilizing the simulated data in a similar regression (that additionally includes year dummies). For the entire sample the coefficients are 0.038 and 0.101 for the actual and simulated data, respectively, suggesting that about 0.06 of the coefficient in the pooled cross section for the entire sample may be attributable to the topcode. For men the coefficients are 0.190 and 0.2623, and for women they are 2 0.003 and 2 0.002. Table III reports, for the three samples and two speci cations, (1) the annualized trend in the average 10-, 20-, 30-, and 40-50 differentials, (2) the trend when mw and its square is included, and (3) the estimated derivative evaluated at the overall mean of mwthroughout [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] . For women in the pooled cross section the minimum wage appears to explain roughly 75 percent to virtually all of the growth in lower tail percentile differentials.
WAGE INEQUALITY AND THE MINIMUM WAGE
28 For the pooled cross-section speci cation using the entire sample, all of the expansion in the lower tail differentials can be accounted for by mw.
28. The result for the 10-50 differential for women should be interpreted with the caveat that the average difference between the minimum and the tenth percentile is about two log points 1979 (see Data Appendix), meaning that identi cation of the growth in the latent 10-50 is more tenuous, as mentioned in subsection III.B. 
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In light of Table II the results for the state xed effects speci cation, as well as for men, might be interpreted with considerable caution, but I include them in Table III for completeness. For the entire sample and for women, the xed effects estimates imply that the minimum wage can account for about half of the rise in inequality. For men the results are mixed: for example, the pooled cross-section estimate implies that about 55 percent of the fall in the 20-50 differential is due to the declining minimum, while the corresponding xed effects estimate suggests 0 percent.
V. WAGE COMPRESSION AND THE MINIMUM WAGE: 1989-1991
After a decade of constancy the nominal federal minimum wage rate rose, effective in April 1990, from $3.35 to $3.80, and again in April of 1991, from $3.80 to $4.25. Prior to this time, several of the states (see Appendix 3) had already legislated their own minimum wage rates that were higher than the forthcoming rise in the federal rate. As a result, the newly imposed federal minimum generated variability in changes in the effective minimum wage level across states.
The source of this variability stands in sharp contrast to that which generated variation in the effective minimum wage in the previous analysis. It affords an opportunity to estimate the impact of the minimum wage on the wage distribution under an alternative set of identifying assumptions. Instead of relying on the assumption that the measures of centrality of states' wage distributions (used to ''de ate'' the federal minimum rate) are uncorrelated with latent wage dispersion, the analysis below adopts the identifying assumption that the binding (relative) minimum rate (the maximum of the federal and the state-speci c rate) is uncorrelated with changes in latent wage inequality across states. Card and Krueger [1995] use this latter approach to examine the impact of the minimum wage on the wage distribution. We can compare the estimates using the approach of Card and Krueger with those utilizing the procedure of Section IV, for the same time period (1989) (1990) (1991) . 29 We can further compare these estimates with those using the data for the 1979-1988 period. Finding consistency among these various estimates would seem to lend some support to the ndings of the previous section.
29 . Card and Krueger [1995] utilize a different minimum wage measure: the fraction of workers in each state in 1989 who earn more than the 1989 rate and less than the 1991 rate. Table IV gives a sense of the magnitude of the average changes in both the minimum wage and the 10-50 differential for two groups of states: the states that in 1989 had minimum wages greater than the federal minimum, and all other states. 30 For men, women, and the entire sample, the group with state minimums equal to or less than the federal rate in 1989 experience an average increase in mw of about 8 or 9 percent by 1990, and an additional 7 percent in 1991. By contrast, the group of states 30. The states with higher minimums were California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Alaska was excluded because its state minimum is xed, relative to the federal rate. and bottom 30 percent) trimmed mean. ''State . fed'' means that the state had a minimum wage that was higher than the federal minimum in 1989. ''State , 5 fed'' means that the state had a minimum wage that was equal to or less than (or had no state minimum wage provision ) the federal minimum in 1989. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-consistent and consistent with unrestricted autocorrelation withinstate.
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beginning with higher state-speci c minimums experience a very small change in mw. Table IV illustrates that the two groups' trends in the 10-50 log-wage differential also diverge for women, as well as for the entire sample. For these samples, the group of states that experienced the 16 percent average growth in mw witnessed an average compression in their 10-50 differentials of about 3 percent, whereas the remaining states experienced a 1 or 2 percent expansion in the 10-50 gap. The divergent pattern is not found in the results for men, for whom the difference between the initial minimum and the tenth percentile in 1989 was greatest, at about 38 log points.
Utilizing legislation-induced changes in the minimum wage is formally implemented by estimating the state xed effects speci cation that was used in the lower panel of Table III (using equations (7) and (8)). Within-state variation in mw during 1989-1991 is much smaller than the total cross-sectional variability, as was the case for the 1979-1988 data. For the combined sample in the 1989-1991 period, a regression of mw on time dummies yields a root mean squared error of 0.137. Adding state dummies to this regression reduces it to 0.040, implying that (0.040 2 /0.137 2 ) 5 0.085 of the residual variability (after taking out time effects) in mwis within-state, and that identi cation will be relatively weaker than in the pooled cross-section speci cation. However, virtually all of this within-state variation in mw is generated by changes in the legislated minimum rate, as opposed to transitory, within-state changes in the centrality measures of the states' wage distributions. Adding the nominal legislated rate to the above regression brings the root mean squared error from 0.040 to 0.013, implying that ((0.040) 2 2 0.013 2 )/(0.040 2 ) 5 0.894 of the ''within-state'' variance in mw is indeed driven by legislation-induced changes for the 1989-1991 period; as noted in Section IV, the comparable gure for the 1979-1988 data is close to zero. Table V presents results for the 1989-1991 period using the 10-50 differential as the dependent variable. For both women and the combined sample, the coefficients on both the linear and quadratic terms in the xed effects speci cation are quite similar to the corresponding estimates in the pooled cross section. The implied derivatives (and standard errors) evaluated at the 1989-1991 mean of mw, are 0.262 (0.096) and 0.349 (0.072) in the state xed effects speci cation, for the combined sample and women, respectively. The corresponding derivatives are 0.320 (0.073) and
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0.308 (0.060) for the pooled cross-section speci cation. Furthermore, evaluated at the 1979-1988 mean of mw, the pooled cross-section (and xed effects) estimates of the derivative are 0.482 (0.415) and 0.578 (0.597), for the combined sample and women, respectively. These are quite comparable to the estimated derivatives from the pooled cross-section estimates reported in Table III (0.469 and 0.561), which used the 1979-1988 data.
By contrast, the two speci cations' coefficients on mwand its 
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square are in less agreement for the sample of men. The implied derivatives (and standard errors) are 0.033 (0.0120) and 0.270 (0.068) for the xed effects and pooled cross-section speci cations, respectively. This nding provides some reason to lessen our con dence in the results for men. Examination of the empirical relation between the upper tail percentile differentials and mw provides some further reason to place more con dence in the results for the combined sample, and women, relative to the results for men. For example, a regression of the 80-50 differential on mwleads to a coefficient (standard error) of 0.094 (0.035), 2 0.003 (0.027), and 0.040 (0.026) for men, women, and the combined sample, respectively. A similar qualitative pattern exists for the various other measures of dispersion in the upper tail. 31 Finally, note that a comparison of the year coefficients in regressions, with and without mw, reveals that for women, and the combined sample, the modest compression in the observed 10-50 differential of about two log points across states belies what appears to be an expansion of the latent 10-50 gap of about one to two log points, during the 1989-1991 period.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR BETWEEN-AND WITHIN-GROUP WAGE INEQUALITY
The analysis to this point has focused on the extent to which the minimum wage has contributed to growth in broad measures of wage inequality-the various percentile differentials. Since much of the empirical literature has focused on changes in between-group wage differentials (based on gender, education, age), it is instructive to consider the potential impact of the minimum wage on these wage differentials, as implied by the ndings in the previous sections. Equally informative is the implied effect of the minimum wage on changes in so-called ''within-group'' inequality, which constitutes a large portion of the total growth in wage dispersion in recent decades [Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993] .
A simple way to produce these calculations is given by 31. Using the 90-50 differential yields 0.124, 0.033, and 0.048 for men, women, and the combined sample, respectively; these are the largest (in absolute value) among regressions using the various upper tail percentile differentials (i.e., 60-50, 70-50, 80-50, and 90-50) . The largest (in absolute value) for analogous xed effects estimates using the upper tail was 2 0.108 (with a standard error of 0.095) for the 90-50 differential for the combined sample; all other estimates (using any of the samples, or upper tail measures) were smaller in absolute value and could not be statistically rejected from zero. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux [1996] , who simulate a counterfactual wage density for 1988, adjusting the minimum wage to its 1979 level, in real terms. I follow this general approach; but instead of making speci c assumptions about how the minimum wage affects the lower tail of the distribution, I simply employ the estimates of the previous section on the empirical relation between the minimum and the lower tail percentile differentials across states.
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I do so in the following way. First, I determine for each observation in the microdata (that was used to create the statelevel panel data set), its percentile in the overall wage distribution, on a state-by-state basis. Then according to this relative position, I add or subtract an amount to the log-wage of the worker according to estimates of b and g (from equation (7) to the worker's actual log-wage in 1989, where p denotes the within-state percentile, j the state, bˆp and gˆp the estimated coefficients from the regression described by column (5) of Table I Although the separate estimates bˆp and gˆp for men, women, and the combined sample can be applied to each respective sample, the accumulation of evidence to this point suggests that we might place the most con dence in the estimates from the pooled cross-section speci cation for women, and for the combined sample. And in particular, it suggests that the results for men be viewed with considerable suspicion. Thus, in the simulation exercise I adjust the wages of the entire sample of earners, using the pooled cross-sectional estimates of bˆp and gˆp from the entire sample, but report the various between-and within-group wage dispersion measures by men and women separately. 33 It is impor-32. The nominal minimum rate was $2. 90 in 1979, $3.35 in 1989 , and the change in the national median log(wage) for all workers was 0.50.
33. I use estimates from regressing each of the 49 lower tail differentials (1-50 to 49-50) on a quadratic in mw, using data from the entire time period, 1979-1991, weighting by the number of observations in each state-year cell.
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tant to note that the validity of the resultant ''counterfactual'' wage differentials rests upon the assumption that the minimum wage affects worker types (irrespective of their education, gender, age, etc.) equally, conditional on the worker's wage level.
Panel A of Table VI reports various comparisons between actual wage differentials (by race, education, and experience), and corresponding differentials from the adjusted microdata for male earners aged 18-64. The mean wages in each group are expressed as relative to the combined-sample median wage. The rst two columns present the differentials computed from the actual data, the third reports the counterfactual of applying the 1979 relative level of the minimum wage to the 1989 distribution, and the last two columns show the counterfactual differentials resulting from simulating the impact of the 1989 relative minimum on the 1979 and 1989 distributions. 34 An examination of the rst and third columns of the table reveals that the main bene ciary of this hypothetical minimum wage increase are less-experienced high school dropouts, as their average log-wage rises about eight log points due to the adjustment of the 1989 data. The lower part of the table, which reports unadjusted and adjusted changes in the differentials, shows that changes in race, experience, and educational differentials are only moderately attenuated by an adjustment for the minimum wage. It shows that about 14 percent of the increase in the college-high school wage differential for those with 1-10 years of experience is due to the falling minimum wage throughout this period. One notes that this is comparable to the 13 percent calculation provided by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux [1996] . The alternative adjusted changes in the fourth and fth columns give very similar results.
Panel A of Table VI also reports the estimated slope coefficient on years of completed schooling in a wage equation that additionally includes a quartic in potential experience. The adjustment in the third column implies that about (0.004)/(0.088 2 0.061) 5 0.148 of the change in the return to schooling is attributable to the minimum wage.
The adjustment has a much greater impact on the standard deviation of the residuals from the wage regression, a measure of ''within-group'' wage inequality. RMSE is the root mean squared error of a wage regression that includes a complete interaction of 34. The simulation for 1989 makes an adjustment only for workers in states with minimum wages higher than the federal rate. Computed from the CPS Merged outgoing Rotation Earnings Files microdata. Data from 1989 are from 4/89-3/90. Ages 18-64. For variable construction see Data Appendix. All average wage levels are expressed as relative to the overall median wage. The rst two columns use the actual data for 1979 and 1989. The third column is 1989 data adjusted to the 1979 relative minimum, and fourth and fth columns are the 1979 and 1989 differentials adjusted to the 1989 relative minimum (for all states). The adjustment procedure is described in the text. Return to Education is the coefficient on education in a regression of log (wage) on education, a quartic in potential experience (age-educ-6) and a black dummy. RMSE is the root mean squared error from an hours-weighted regression of log (wage) on a set of fully interacted educational categories (4) and single year experience dummies. 90-10, 50-10, and 90-50 are various percentile differentials of the residuals in that regression. Computed from the CPS Merged outgoing Rotation Earnings Files microdata. Data from 1989 are from 4/89-3/90. Ages 18-64. For variable construction see Data Appendix. All average wage levels are expressed as relative to the overall median wage. The rst two columns use the actual data for 1979 and 1989. The third column is 1989 data adjusted to the 1979 relative minimum, and fourth and fth columns are the 1979 and 1989 differentials adjusted to the 1989 relative minimum (for all states). The adjustment procedure is described in the text. Return to education is the coefficient on education in a regression of log (wage) on education, a quartic in potential experience (age-educ-6) and a black dummy. RMSE is the root mean squared error from an hours-weighted regression of log (wage) on a set of fully interacted educational categories (four) and single year experience dummies. 90-10, 50-10, and 90-50 are various percentile differentials of the residuals in that regression. the four educational groups (, 12, 12, 13-15, 161 ) and dummies for each single year of experience. Rather than rising from 0.393 to 0.432 (9.9 percent rise) from 1979 to 1989, it rises to 0.405 (3.1 percent), accounting for the minimum wage. The following three lines, ''90-10,'' ''50-10,'' and ''90-50,' ' report the corresponding percentile differentials of these residuals. It reveals that the adjustment makes a difference mostly in the lower tail of the distribution of residuals.
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Panel B of Table VI reports the results for women. A comparison of the rst and fourth columns suggest that lessexperienced, high school dropout females would have been paid, on average, about 11 percent less in 1979 if it had not been for the supporting effect of the minimum wage. Although the minimum wage appears to be a proportionately greater component of changes in differentials by education, relative to men, two-thirds of the observed changes remain after the adjustment. The adjusted college-high school wage differential continues to rise signi cantly, by about fteen log points for the least experienced, and the college-dropou t differential rises about 19 percent.
A comparison of the unadjusted and adjusted measures of the residual dispersion suggests that between two-thirds and three-quarters of the approximately 20 percent rise in withingroup inequality could be attributable to the declining minimum wage during the 1980s. This estimate, and that for men, are substantially higher than the lower bound estimates given by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux [1996] , who nd that the minimum wage accounts for 24.2 and 34.0 percent of the rise in residual dispersion, for men and women, respectively. 35 I note that while the estimates here suggest that much of the growth in inequality in the lower tail can be attributed to the minimum wage, substantial growth in dispersion in the upper tail remains during the 1980s. As shown in Panels A and B of Table VI, the 90-50 log-wage differential expands by about ten or eleven log points for both men and women. For men the minimum wage appears to account for about 70 (or more) percent of the growth of the 50-10 differential, but about 75 percent of the widening 50-25 gap still remains, implying that an analysis 35. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux [1996] adopt three assumptions to produce their lower bound estimates: (1) no disemployment effect, (2) no spillovers, and (3) the shape of the density below the minimum remains the same (even if the fraction below changes). They note that these assumptions work to understate the impact of the minimum. The estimates in their study as well as the present analysis depart somewhat from the analysis of Bernard and Jensen [1998] , who nd virtually no role for the minimum wage in explaining differences in residual wage inequality, using cross state differences from Census data.
which ignores the minimum wage would not lead to a serious overstatement of increasing inequality, if the focus is on the upper 75 percent of the distribution. It should also be noted, however, that the same cannot be said for women. As the upper part of Panel B reveals, the minimum appears to have had such an important impact that about 50 to 60 percent of the thirteen log point rise in the 75-25 differential is explained by the minimum.
Curiously, accounting for the minimum wage has a considerably more striking impact on the impression of overall inequality for the unconditional distribution of wages (men and women combined). As a graphical summary of the core speci cation provided in Table I , Figure VII plots the actual average change (1979 to 1989) for each (from the 5-50 to the 95-50) percentile differential; these are essentially the ''1989'' coefficients in column (1) of Table I coefficients from the core speci cation (column (5), Table I ) which includes mwfor each percentile up to the median. It shows that, after accounting for the minimum wage, the modest increase in dispersion in the upper tail of the overall wage distribution appears to be offset by an equally modest compression in the lower tail, so as to keep measures of the latent 90-10 or 75-25 differential relatively constant over time. This nding is roughly consistent with Teulings [1998] , who in a recent alternative analysis of the impact of the minimum wage, uses a exible parameterization of the wage distribution across time and regions within the United States, and concludes that the minimum wage can fully explain the growth in inequality of the unconditional distribution of wages during the 1980s.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Two principal ndings emerge from the above empirical analysis. First, estimates that exploit cross-state variation in the ''effective'' minimum wage imply that a great majority of the observed growth in inequality in the lower tail of the distribution is attributable to the erosion of the real value of the federal minimum wage rate during the 1980s. The estimates imply that the falling relative level of the minimum wage can explain from 70 to 100 percent of the growth in inequality in the lower tail of the female wage distribution, and for men, about 70 percent and 25 percent of the growth in the 50-10 and 50-25 differentials, respectively. For both men and women, analyzed separately, much growth in inequality remains (mostly in the upper tail of the distribution) during this period. Curiously, however, after accounting for the minimum wage, the unconditional distribution (men and women combined) exhibits a compression in the lower tail (50-10 differential) that is of the same magnitude as the modest expansion in the upper tail (90-50 differential) of the distribution.
Second, the magnitudes of this study's estimates imply that ignoring the declining real value of the minimum wage leads to only a moderate exaggeration of the growth in between-group wage inequality; the broad trends in educational and experience differentials are unaffected. But ignoring the minimum wage leads to a substantial overstatement of the growth in residual, ''within-group'' wage inequality during the 1980s; the minimum wage may explain between 60 to 80 percent of the rise in this component of wage inequality.
The credibility of the estimates provided here depend on the
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
validity of the assumption that latent wage inequality is uncorrelated with measures of the centrality of states' log-wage distributions (and hence with the relative minimums). I nd evidence that supports this notion for women, and to a lesser extent, for the entire sample of workers. Also, I nd evidence that casts doubt on this notion for the sample of male workers. For example, for the sample of women there are negligible correlations between measures of wage dispersion in the upper tail and the relative minimum. This is at odds with the notion that an inherent relation between the overall scale and location of the states' distributions is causing an upward bias of the estimate of the minimum wage's impact across states. An analogous analysis provides a weaker case for the validity of the cross-sectional results for the combined sample. The weakest case is for the analysis of the male sample, where the correlations between the relative minimum and the several measures of upper tail wage dispersion are all large and statistically signi cant.
Second, I provide estimates generated by a qualitatively different source of variability in changes in the effective minimum-that which is driven by an interaction between preexisting variability in state-legislated wage oors and the imposition of a higher, binding federal minimum in the early 1990s. For women as well as the combined sample, the resulting estimates are quite similar to those resulting from the earlier cross-sectional analysis. By contrast, the divergence of the two estimates when analyzing men in isolation provides reason to suspect the main results for the male sample.
The ndings in this paper point have a few implications for future research on wage and earnings inequality. First, suppose that we take the ndings here at face value-that a minimum wage that kept pace with in ation would have resulted in a relatively unchanging unconditional distribution of wages for hours worked in the economy during the 1980s. Given the suggestion of the previous literature that the minimum wage played a small role in the substantial rise in household income inequality, explaining this rise would seem necessarily to involve a change in the nature of the mapping between hourly wages and household income. 37 This intermediate link includes how the distributions of wages and hours worked map into weekly earnings, and in turn, 37 . See Brown's [1999] recent survey of the literature on the minimum wage for a discussion of these issues.
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how weekly earnings and the distribution of weeks worked in the year map into annual earnings. It also includes issues of how individual earners come together to form households. And of course, the magnitude of disemployment effects due to the minimum wage-especially at a time such as the early 1980s, when the minimum wage was relatively high-is an integral part of this intermediate link. Since this study has focused exclusively on the observed wage distribution without accounting for these issues, its ndings, taken alone, cannot be used to adequately assess the impact of the minimum wage on the distribution of economic welfare more generally.
APPENDIX 1: DATA APPENDIX
State Wage Data
All computations (except for the pre-1979 data shown in Figure II) were derived from the National Bureau of Economic Research Extract of the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files. Unless otherwise noted, the sample includes all individuals aged sixteen or over. The sample excludes the self-employed, unemployed, and those not in the labor force. In order to create a wage measure consistent over the entire time period, I construct the wage from ''unedited'' variables of the hourly rate of pay, usual weekly earnings, and usual weekly hours worked, since the imputation procedure for those with missing earnings variables seems to have changed signi cantly between 1988 and 1989. In order to have a nonmissing wage, an individual must report either (1) the hourly rate of pay or (2) usual weekly earnings and usual weekly hours worked. In cases where an individual had both values, the higher of the two was used. Note that since I use ''unedited'' wage variables, all individuals with ''imputed'' wages are excluded from the analysis. Note also that no exclusions of observations were made due to implausible or ''extreme'' wage values. A comparable sample selection and variable construction procedure was used for the May CPS data for Figure II . Resulting sizes per year (for workers aged 18-64, for example) for the Outgoing Rotation Groups ranged from about 130,000 in 1979 to 140,000 in 1989.
Using these microdata, a panel of the 50 states' wage percentiles was calculated for the 1979-1991 period. Three main panels were constructed: that for men only, women only, and that for the combined sample. In addition, separate panels were constructed
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
